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ABSTRACT 
 
   EMPOWERMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE: 
IMPACT OF DECREES HAVING FORCE OF LAW  
ON TURKISH POLITICS 
 
                                         by 
                                   ELIF ARDIC 
 
 Supervisor: Ass. Prof.Dr Omer Faruk Genkaya 
 
This study aims at analyzing the trends of empowerment of executive and 
rationalization of parliament and their instruments. 
 
Executive -legislative relations in different government systems and the 
concepts like rationalization of parliament, delegative democracy, decline of 
parliament are elaborated with a particular reference to executive decree 
authority. 
 
Also the work argues the relation between economic crisis and quest for a 
powerful executive. And the crux of this study is that it attempts at revealing 
the role of the decrees having force of law in political systems with a special 
reference to Turkish case.  
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ÖZET 
YÜRÜTMENIN GÜÇLENDİRİLMESİ: 
 KANUN HÜKMÜNDE KARARNAMELERİN  
TÜRK SİYASETİNE ETKİSİ 
 
                   ELİF ARDIÇ 
 
        Tez Danışmanı : Ömer Faruk Gençkaya 
 
Bu çalışmada Türkiye’de ve dünyada yürütmenin güçlendirilmesi ve 
parlamentonun rasyonelleştirilmesi akımı ve bu akımın araçları üzerinde 
durulmaktadır. 
 
Temsili demokrasilerde değişen yasama yürütme ilişkileri farklı hükümet 
sistemleri üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bununla beraber  parlamentoların 
rasyonelleştirilmesi, delegasyoncu demokrasi ve parlamentonun önemini 
yitirmesi ve gerilemesi gibi kavramlar kanun hükmünde kararname 
uygulaması bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. 
 
Ayrıca bu çalışmada ekonomik krizler ve güçlü yürütme arayışı arasındaki 
ilişki tartışılmaktadır. Çalışma temel olarak kanun hükmünde kararname 
yetkisinin farklı siyasal sistemlerde ve özellikle 1980 sonrasi Türk siyasetinde 
yerini ve etkisini tartışmaktadır. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The empowerment of executive is refers to its superiority to legislative 
branch in the sense of power and function and also indicates transfer of some of 
powers of the latter to the executive. In other words political power centralizes in 
hands of executive. 
In parliamentary and semi-presidential systems this trend is called 
rationalization of parliament, which was first used by Boris Mirkine Guetzevitch 
(Gozler, 2000:25). After the Second World War some of the constitution–makers 
attempted to restrict the powers of the parliaments vis a vis the executive. Both the 
1949 German Constitution and the 1958 French Constitution providing the 
mechanisms of rationalization of parliament can be regarded as typical examples. 
The main aim of rationalization of parliament is claimed to ensure stability 
of governments. It has been generally argued that parliamentarism causes 
government instability in the absence of sufficient majority backing the 
government. In presidential systems, president is elected for a fixed term and 
cannot be discharged, except for impeachment. And it is claimed that this 
guarantees the stability of the executive branch. There is no mechanism, which 
guarantees the stability of government in parliamentary system. Especially in 
multi-party systems, where coalition governments considered to be weak 
governmental instability is more likely (Sartori, 1997). 
Governmental stability is not the only aim of the rationalization of 
parliaments. Also, Council of ministers or prime ministers must be able to govern 
the country. This requires ability to enact the laws and decrees, which 
governments deem necessary. That’s why there are measures to ease enacting laws 
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and decrees. For example, the French Constitution brought the package voting 
procedure with the Article 44. According to the usual procedure, each article of a 
draft law is discussed by parliament separately. However, the Article 44 of the 
French Constitution entitles the governments to ask the assembly to vote the law as 
a whole. Also, the Constitution empowers the government with autonomous 
decree authority, by which government does not need authorizing law to make 
regulations (Huber, 1996). 
Everywhere in the world, including advanced liberal countries or 
developing countries; legislative power has experienced a decline whereas 
executive and administrative institutions have tended to gain grants of substantial 
legislative power. Legislatures, even in the most stable and robust liberal 
democracies have undergone a dramatic erosion of political influence in our 
century (Schuerman, 1999: 14). Most important administrative agencies now 
exercise significant law-making functions and decrees often take greater de facto 
significance than parliament` s general laws. 
This process is not different in presidential systems. It is claimed that 
modern political systems have been changing from institutionalization to 
personalization. As the executive gains more power, the president’s and the head 
of the government’s power and authority becomes more personalized (Karatepe, 
1988: 24). In other words, the future of democracy is left more or less to the 
initiative and responsibility of the governing elite (Genckaya, 2000: 37-38). 
In this thesis the mechanisms, which fasten the decision making process in 
Turkey are analyzed comparatively. Besides this thesis explores the reasons 
leading to the empowerment of the executive. Furthermore the thesis attempts to 
elaborate how these mechanisms weaken accountability of executive branch. 
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The main research question of the thesis is to what extent mechanisms 
empowering executive can lead to an effective and efficient government with a 
special reference to Turkey. In doing this decree having force of law (DFL) is 
taken as a unit of analysis in comparative perspective including countries where 
executive decree authority has become a major instrument in decision making 
process. 
By using descriptive - historical method, I attempt to analyze DFLs in 
Turkish politics. In this respect I classify DFLs by the volume, scope and 
governmental periods. Also I analyze the Constitutional review process on the 
DHLs issued by the governments. Data are collected from Official Gazette, 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
The first part of the thesis tries to examine the characteristics of executive 
legislative relations and exercise of executive decree authority in three different 
government systems with case countries. 
The second chapter provides the legal and constitutional framework of 
empowerment of executive and rationalization of parliament with particular 
emphasis on the 1982 Constitution 
The third and last chapter of the thesis, problematises the impact and role 
of decrees having force of law in Turkish politics in the post 1980 period. The 
DFLs, which were issued in the last two decades, are analyzed with special 
reference to their scope and enforcement. By doing this major regulation areas of 
the decrees having force of laws are tried to be revealed 
. 
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In concluding chapter I pointed out some major problems arising from 
enforcement of decree authority in the light of the analysis provided in the third 
chapter of the thesis for Turkey. 
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CHAPTER   I 
 
I .   EMPOWERMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE AS A TREND 
1.1 Reasons of Empowerment of the Executive 
 
Empowering the executive has been an trend starting after the II World 
War in most of the Western democracies. There are reasons1 and mechanisms to 
enable the executive powerful Some of these legal mechanisms include restrictions 
for legislative power. The others give executive constitutional-based and expanded 
rights and powers. This is called rationalization of parliament. Scholarly there are 
arguments about the reasons of the trend of powerful executives. 
First of all in parliamentary regimes, levels of party discipline changes the 
relation between government and parliament. Party discipline refers to the extend 
to which legislative party leaders can compel legislators to vote as a bloc, even if 
the individual legislators would prefer voting against their party on specific 
issues(Shugart and Carey, 1998: 17). In systems where executive is depended on 
parliamentary support a majority government can easily and inevitably influences 
and manipulates the parliamentary procedure. It can enact its proposals through 
parliament. But on the other hand if a government has a weak parliamentary group 
it will not be able to exercise its powers holding in its hands( Oytan, 1977: 541). 
Secondly, legislative branch is frequently slow in its nature whereas the 
need to implement new policies might be pressing. It is necessary to escape rules 
                                                          
 These reasons can be listed as Scientific and Technological developments, state of emergency 
and its lasting effects, state intervention to the economy, (Ozkol.1969, 56-57) and impact of 
globalization 
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of operation of parliament in state of emergency( Tan, 1972:28 also Kuzu, 1985: 
179). 
Moreover, the existence of an independent judiciary with the authority to 
rule on the legality and constitutionality of executive regulations should contribute 
to  increase of delegation of decision–making power to executives (Shugart and 
Carey ,1998). 
As political institutions parliaments some times escape from using 
legislative power. This evasion is consequence of populist policies. Parliaments 
don’t want some laws to be enacted for fear of not to be elected. Thus, the 
executive branch is given priority and responsibility in decision -making process. 
Also information about the connections between policy choices and policy 
outcomes is in choronic short supply in legislators because of a free –rider 
problem. Individual legislators lack the incentive for gathering information about 
outcomes of policies (Shugart and Carey , 1998 17-18). 
In fact, the most important reason of this trend has been economic and 
technological development. Reinterpratation of the state’s role in the market 
economy, created very difficult and complicated problems. Because of insufficient 
knowledge of the parliaments, they cannot foresee in most of part of the economic 
and technical issues. Lack of policy expertise of legislatures and information 
shortages are a motivation for delegation of decision-making power to the 
executive branches( Shugart and Carey , 1998: 18). All of these reasons claim that 
new economic and political context, in which we live requires strong executive 
( Tan, 1972 also Ozbudun, 1989). Globalization, information technology and neo- 
managerialism speeded up the process of government eventually leading to fast 
decision making authority. 
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Modern democracies are characterized by shared decision-making of the 
legislatures and executive branches. But the health of a democracy declines 
dramatically, when the executive branch excessively dominates the legislature. 
In fact, the need for strong legislatures is reflected in the very meaning of 
democracy. However, many legislatures are, overwhelmingly dominated by the 
executive branch. This problem is especially prevalent in emerging democracies 
(Norton, 1993, Olson, 1994). 
The type of governmental system under which a country operates 
fundamentally influences the structure and the tenor of executive legislative 
relations. Explanation for executive dominance in parliamentary and presidential 
systems may have different aspects. 
Then, how can we understand parliamentary delegation to the Council of 
ministers and /or the rest of the executive branch? There are mechanisms or 
institutions, which empowers the executive in various political systems. And 
explaining the role and impact of these institutions in political decision-making is 
very important. Yet the poor theoretical understanding of the role of institutions 
and lack of empirical studies on the role of institutions constitute an obstacle for 
analysis of political life. 
 
1.2 Economic Perspective of Empowerment of the Executive 
The latest developments in institutional thinking may be understood as an 
intellectual response to the social problems of modernization, Industrialization 
created an increasingly urban population with no political voice Pressure for such 
a voice was to result in the widening of the franchise and growth of political 
parties. Party, thus, came to dominate the electoral and parliamentary processes. 
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Party leaders occupied the central positions of government and decided what 
measures were to be laid before the legislature for approval (Keman, 1997: 55.) 
Thus the locus of the policy making shifted from the legislature to the government. 
Industrialization had a further effect. Not only did it generate a mass 
franchise, it also resulted in a more specialized society. Political social as well as 
economic interests became more differentiated and more organized. The more 
specialized government policy became, the more government relied on groups for 
advice, and co-operation in implementing policy. In the process of law making, 
legislatures came to be seen as increasingly marginalized. Party or parties 
dominate in the legislature. The specific measures of public policy are, formulated 
by government following consultation with affected interests. (Norton, 1993: 3-4) 
Due to the welfare state intervention, the western societies have overcome the 
severe problems of large-scale poverty. Nevertheless a new collection of social 
and economic problems has aroused since the late 1970s (Ozkol, 1969: 56- 57; 
Keman, 1997). The institutions of welfare state not only regulated the process of 
economic modernization but also conferred moral and social stability (Keman, 
1997: 64). In this respect the rational planning and control is not only based on the 
assumption of rationalist perspective on decision-making, but also implies the 
centralization of decision-making (Keman, 1997: 119). And also the recent 
attempts to roll back the frontiers of the state through deregulation and 
privatization have to some extent been prompted by awareness that excessive state 
regulation involves giving more and more power to state bureaucrats who enact 
rules. 
The state of economy of each country can be regarded as another factor 
leading to executive dominance. Under crisis conditions, public is willing to grant 
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executives wide leeway in formulating and initiating reform programs though the 
extend of public tolerance will depend on the depth of the crisis. The capacity to 
manage the political pressures associated with the initiation and consolidation of 
economic reform is not simply a function of economic circumstance; it also 
depends on the way new democratic institutions aggregates the preferences of 
contending social groups and empowered executives to act. Centralized executive 
authority plays a pivotal role in overcoming the collective action problems and 
distributive conflicts associated with the initiation of comprehensive economic 
reforms. The effective promulgation and initial pursuit of the reform strategy will 
depend on the powers of the executive (Shugart and Carey, 1998). 
For example in Latin America, the choice of presidentalism over 
parliamentarism reflected deeply rooted historical traditions rather than 
calculations about the ability of executives to initiate or sustain economic reforms. 
Nonetheless it is important to underline that in a number of crisis cases attempts 
were made to further buttress executive power over economic decision –making 
through constitutional provisions that granted presidents expansive legislative 
powers or decree authority or permitted legislatures to delegate such powers. 
The politics of executive power are different in the non-crisis cases though 
constitutional arrangements can strengthen the hand of the executive by expanding 
the discretionary power to initiate policy or insulating decision-making from short-
term political pressures such mechanisms cannot provide effective basis for policy 
coordination. To the contrary, strong executive discretion can weaken the 
incentives for party, legislature and interest groups to provide political support for 
policy initiatives (Parrish, 1998: 71). 
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1.3 Political Perspective of Empowerment of the Executive 
After 1970s, in most part of the world the role of the executive has been changing 
and increasing in decision making process. In most democratic legislatures, the 
executive branch introduces 90 Per cent of the legislation, which is passed (Olson, 
1994: 84).  In addition to this fact, delegation of law-making authority from 
legislatures to the executive is another important issue, which is explained by 
scholars in different ways 
When we think on democracy theories, restrictions for parliaments and 
delegation of power is seen undemocratic and indicating the usurpation of the 
legislative power by some scholars. This is because empowerment of executive 
has two important consequences. One of them is the decline of parliament thesis 
(see Loewerberg,1971); the other is related to personalization of governments also 
lack of accountability and popular participation (see Linz, 1994; Przeworski 1991; 
Mainwaring 1993, Conoghan and Malloy, 1990). For example Przeworzki 
describes this process in Latin America like: 
Democracy is weakened. The political process is reduced to elections .The 
government rules by decree in an authoritarian fashion but often without 
much repression. All the power in the state is concentrated in the executive. 
People get a regular chance to vote but not to choose 
 
Also Conaghan and Malloy (1990: 27) develop a similar argument 
Executives were capable of acting in decidedly authoritarian mode, despite 
the formal democratic frameworks within which executive power was 
formulated and legitimated. These are (Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia) hybrid form 
of governments in which a formal democratic facade masks a real 
authoritarian bent 
 
Another usurpation interpretation of this trends is developed by 
O`Donnell(1994: 59). Acording to O` Donnell delegative democracies are mostly 
characterized by policy making by executive decree. These are regimes in which 
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whomever wins elections to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or 
she fits. 
The other group considers these changes in the executive legislative 
relations as an advantage for legislatures. It is claimed that any delegation of 
power does not necessarily means usurpation (Shugart and Carey, 1992 and 1998). 
Also it is argued that the more difficult it is for legislators to build and maintain 
coalitions capable of passing legislation, the more attractive will be the alternative 
of providing the executive with decree authority, either delegated or constitutional. 
Lack of policy expertise relative to executives is another reason legislators might 
prefer executive decree to standard legislative procedures. Finally, time constraints 
might impel legislators to prefer executive decree authority to standard legislative 
procedure (Shugart and Carey, 1998: 17-18). 
Although the importance of these theoretical arguments on empowerment of 
executive it is equally important to examine the special conditions of each country 
in answering the question of what does executive dominance in decision- making 
mean for a political system. However we can describe some common aspects for 
empowerment of executive, existing as a trend in most part of the world after 
1970s with special reference to presidential, parliamentary and semi- presidential 
systems. 
 
1.4 Empowerment of Executive in Different Political Systems 
1.4.1 Presidential Systems 
 
In a presidential model the legislative and executive are separated into two distinct 
branches with their own independent electoral mandate.  There are two important 
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distinctions between parliamentary and presidential systems in this respect. A 
parliamentary executive holds only those legislative powers that had been 
delegated to it by the assembly while a presidential executive typically has 
entrenched legislative powers in addition to powers delegated by the assembly. 
The second distinction is that because some legislative powers are constitutionally 
given to the president there is a variation among presidential systems in terms of 
how much legislative power their executives hold (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 130-
132). 
Moreover a presidential system does not clearly exhibit what represents 
delegation of authority and what represents an executive simply circumventing the 
assembly, while the assembly abdicates its own authority. 
The authority of legislatures as forums for deliberation and compromise 
among diverse political forces is widely acknowledged (Lijphart, 1984; 
Prezeworski, 1991). Authority within the executive on the other hand, is usually 
more centralized.  In presidential systems executives tend to be controlled by 
single parties and some times even by individuals with weak or no connections to 
political parties (Linz, 1994: 30). At this point it is argued that legislatures are 
being marginalized and democratic institutions are ineffectual (Carey and Shugart, 
1998: 2). 
To understand the meaning of decline of parliaments, emergence of 
presidential systems in most part of the world and empowerment of executive 
within the parliamentary systems one should examine political system of the each 
country case. Below most important mechanism of this process, executive decree 
authority in parliamentary and presidential systems will be elaborated as an 
indicator of decline and/or rationalization of parliaments thesis. 
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Legis is the genitive of lex, meaning law; lator means carrier or proposer. 
Legislatures have thus by definition, been treated as bodies for carrying or making 
law. It was the very task that gave them their name and justified their existence 
(Olson, 1994: 10). Now and since 1970s executives are using decree power 
(delegated legislation) frequently. Does it mean that executives are becoming the 
legislator of new political systems or does this process have another meaning? 
Among others Latin American presidencies have demonstrated very 
powerful presidents. However despite their power it is argued that these regimes 
have less successful records of democratic longevity than other types of 
presidential systems (Shugart; Carey, 1992: 13-15). Also widespread use of 
delegated legislation is often seen as a symptom of the malaise of presidentalism. 
First, because, it suggests that in a presidential system, the Congress tends to 
abdicate its responsibilities out of apathy frustration, or simply because presidents 
often tend to stretch their delegated powers beyond the limits set by the enabling 
act. But the proliferation of delegated legislation is not a practice found only 
presidential systems, it is a widespread practice that raises important issues about 
the nature of democracy and state power in modern complex societies. 
In presidential systems executive decree authority uncovers a great deal of 
variation in the degree to which different presidents are endowed with 
constitutional decree authority Carey and Shugart (1998) point out that 
constitutional decree authority alone does not allow president to set a policy 
unilaterally. Delegated legislation is different from the constitutional decree 
authority in presidential systems.2 
                                                          
 Delegated legislation requires an authorization law, but the concept of constitutional decree 
authority indicates that executives are authorized by the Constitution. There are two types of 
Constitutional decree authority. The first type is emergency decree authority; the second one is 
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On the other hand executive orders are mechanisms used by presidents to 
circumvent the constitutionally prescribed policy-making process. The executive 
order also allows presidents strategically enabling them to pursue policy goals in 
an efficient and alternative manner. 
Another case country for presidential systems is United States of America 
(USA). The role of the executive orders in USA is very important in the legislative 
process. Generally executive orders are used to circumvent a hostile congress. This 
is the conventional wisdom on executive decrees in United States. As a president’s 
legislative success declines in each chamber, they will be more inclined to issue 
executive orders as a means to circumvent the legislative process. But some 
scholars challenge this view and claim that presidents issue more decrees under 
unified than divided government (Shull and Gomez, 1997, 103). This means 
executive orders are primarily a vehicle for reinforcing legislative victories rather 
than circumventing a hostile congress. But the more accepted fact is that presidents 
issue more executive orders as their public support falls. 
Executive decrees have been used widely in Latin America after 1980s 
Chile is one of these countries. The military coup of September 11, 1973 brought 
to an end to one of the longest periods of democratic rule in South America. In a 
decree law issued on September 24, 1973 the Congress was dissolved and all 
legislative functions were indefinitely transferred to the governing Junta  
(Valenzuela, 1990: 67). 
The constitution of 1980 drafted by the authoritarian government and 
approved in a national plebiscite. In addition to the creation of a strong executive 
                                                                                                                                                                
standard decree authority. Emergency decree authority is generally subject to strict legislative 
approval and their aim is restricted to restore the public order. But especially through standard 
constitutional decree authority executives set broad policies.    
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military authority also sought to devise an electoral system that would 
fundamentally transform the fractious Chilean multiparty system ( Siavelis,1992 : 
321-322). 
After 1980s, delegated legislation was widely used in Chile. This type of 
legislative enactment was known as decrees having force of law, DFL. DFLs were 
generally used to consolidate and systematize rules in areas where the Congress 
had either approved legislative norms. For example they were enforced in areas 
such as housing, economic regulation, social security and industrial relations 
(Faundez, 1992: 315-317).  Besides, the Article 62 of constitution states that the 
president of the Republic holds the exclusive initiative for proposal of law related 
to changes in the political or administrative division of the country. 
Like in many Latin American countries, the issuing of decrees plays an 
important role in policy making in Chile. In practice decrees can undermine the 
effectiveness of congressional veto players and consequently lower the barriers to 
policy change in presidential systems (Faundez, 1992: 319). 
The use of decrees raises the question the extent to which Congress in such 
systems maintains a role in the legislative process. In much of the Latin America 
decretismo became the normal mechanism of government. Technically decretismo 
includes and extends to executive acts that do not have the form of law. But in its 
non-technical meaning decretismo points to the excessive use, indeed abuse of 
legislating by decree. It is claimed that decretismo is a dysfunctional response of 
or to non-functioning system. (Parrish, 1998) This argument has parallelism to the 
argument that under crisis conditions powerful executive is necessary. 
Another important country case of the delegated legislation is Russia. Since 
the introduction of an independently elected president in Russia in May 1991, 
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presidential decrees have played a central role in the political development of the 
country. The president has been granted significant constitutional decree authority 
and in the first Russian Republic (1991-93) the assembly delegated sweeping 
powers to President Boris Yeltsin. President Yeltsin ‘s use of decrees has often 
been termed autocratic.  Although, some Western analysists have seen Russia as a 
paradigmatic case of delegative democracy, in which the president rules by decree 
and this usurps or at least marginalizes the powers and function of assembly (Linz, 
1994; O’Donnell, 1994)3 . 
Such a democracy these critics hold, is less representative of the popular 
will than one in which an assembly plays a major role and it is also more prone to 
breakdown 
Russia is also an example of dysfunctional response to non-functioning 
systems. Between 1991-93 Yeltsin demanded and received extra-ordinary powers 
from the parliament to cope with the country’s economic problems. In October 
1991 he was given the power to carry out his radical economic program by decree 
from the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (Remington, 1994: 43-45). He 
submitted a bill allowing him to issue decrees having force of law even if they 
contradicted existing legislation. He also requested authority to form a government 
without approval by the Congress (Remington, 1994: 50). 
Urgency played a major role in this delegation decision. Yeltsin 
subsequently exercised this decree authority to influence almost every aspect of 
Russian society although his decrees were sometimes overturned by Constitutional 
Court that was independent of the executive. In the area of industrial reform, 
                                                          
 O’ Donnell’s delegative democracy is not the same term delegated decree authority. O’Donnell’s 
concept is much broader and it is intended to characterize the political system as whole, not just the 
delegation of decree powers to the executive by the assembly (Parrish, 1998, 73) 
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presidential decrees laid out both the basic framework of privatization program 
and specific mechanisms for its implementation (Remington, 1994: 53-54). 
 
1.4 .2 Semi-Presidential Systems 
The recent process of democratization in Central and East Europe and the 
former USSR has generated a considerable amount of interest in the subject of 
constitution –building. These states have had to adopt a new constitution and 
choose a particular set of political institutions. First, many countries actually 
adopted semi-presidential regimes. It has been increasingly a popular form of 
government. 
Semi-presidential regimes can be found in Austria, Ireland, Finland, France 
and Portugal also in East Europe including Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. By 
definition all of these countries share a similar set of basic constitutional features, 
a directly elected fixed term president and a prime minister, who is responsible to 
parliament. But the exercise of political power varies greatly from one to another. 
In France, for example the president is a powerful political actor. In other countries 
such as Finland, there is sometimes uneasy balance of power between the president 
and prime minister. And in the other countries including Austria, Ireland the 
president is merely a figurehead and the prime minister dominates the decision-
making process (See Shugart and Carey 1992). 
The term semi-presidentialism was first scholarly elaborated by Maurice 
Duverger (1980). He provided the first definition of semi-presidentialism and 
stated that a semi-presidential regime was characterized by the fact that the head of 
state is directly elected and he possesses certain powers, which exceed those of a 
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head of state in normal parliamentary regime. A prime minister and ministers can 
stay in office so long as they have the confidence of the parliament. Afterwards 
Duverger altered his definition stating that a semi-presidential system exhibited 
three characteristics (1) the president is elected by universal suffrage (2) opposite 
him, there is a prime minister and ministers who can only govern with the 
confidence of parliament (3) the president can dissolve the parliament (Quoted in 
Shugart and Carey, 1992). 
However the concept of semi-presidentialism has received significant 
critiques. Shugart and Carey found use of the concept to be misleading and instead 
preferred to formulate the concept of premier- presidentialism. It is claimed that 
semi-presidentialism cannot be applied for the regime types except for the regimes 
seen in the Finland and France. Because despite popular election the presidents in 
the other European countries like Austria, Iceland and Ireland are not powerful, it 
is much more reasonable to consider these regimes as operating largely according 
to parliamentary model (Lijphart, 1984: 88). It is also claimed that Duverger 
conceptualizes Semi-presidential regimes are alternating regimes from presidential 
to parliamentary regimes. Concept of Premier-presidential does not indicate 
neither intermediate nor alternating regimes. It indicates the primacy of the 
premier as well as the presence of a president with significant powers  (Shugart; 
Carey, 1992: 15-16). 
The most typical example related to our discussion about empowerment of 
executive in semi-presidential regimes is France. In France, the National Assembly 
does not play an important role in policy making. Political factors and in particular 
the presence of stable coherent majorities are essential in impotence of the 
legislature. There are restrictions to rationalize the parliament in the French 
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Constitution. . The Article 28 of the French Constitution restricts how often the 
National Assembly can meet. Besides the Article 44 states that the government can 
oppose consideration of any amendments that have not been previously debated in 
the committee (Huber, 1998: 20-25). 
The founders of the fifth Republic substantially increased the powers of the 
executive branch and curtailed the prerogatives of parliament. The French 
Constitution of 1958 creates a two-headed executive with a president and a prime 
minister. 
The president has the power to dissolve the parliament. However the 
president has few institutional means for influencing legislative outcomes. The 
president has no formal opportunity to propose policies alter the agenda or amend 
policies in Parliament. In contrast to the United States the French President cannot 
veto bills that have been adapted by the legislature (Huber, 1998:  26). 
The Article 16 of the Constitution, however, gives the president the right to 
declare a state of emergency. Upon making such a declaration, the president 
obtains unlimited power to take measures by decree in response to emergency 
(Huber, 1996: 33-35). 
There are two types of decree authority in France. The first one is the 
emergency decree authority of the president. Emergency decrees have not played a 
prominent role in the politics of the Fifth Republic as only one emergency has 
been declared since 1958 (Huber, 1998:255). 
Another type of decree is passive decree authority or regulatory rule 
making. The framers of the constitution carefully delineated the domain of law in 
article 34 so that it would be possible to establish broader authority for the 
government allowing it more leeway to issue regulatory measures by decree than 
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had been possible in Fourth Republic. The government’s rule making authority 
emerges from the Article 34, 37 and 41. The Article 37 states that, every thing, 
which is not within the domain of law, is considered to be in the “domain of 
regulation”. The Article 41 guarantees that only the government can take actions 
on matters failing within the domain of regulation (Huber, 1998; Soyarslan 1995). 
Two procedures that permit members of the government to make take it or 
leave it policy proposals in parliament compromise the last two forms of decree 
authority in the constitution as “package vote” or “confidence vote”. The package 
vote procedure is used to preserve bargains between political parties during 
coalition and majority government especially on dimensionally complex issues. 
And the confidence vote procedure is used primarily as a tool by which parties can 
communicate issue positions and political responsibility during minority 
government (Huber, 1996: 56-57). 
In France governments make regulatory decrees on an almost daily basis 
making it impossible to examine whether utilization of this decree authority is 
consistent. 
 
1.4.3 Parliamentary Systems 
Scholarly debate between advocates of parliamentary and presidential 
democracy initially focused on which institutional arrangement better contained 
political conflict and provided democratic stability. And this reflected the 
condition in the 1980s when many countries were emerging from periods of non-
democratic rule and choosing between two options. But afterwards the debate 
shifted to policy outcomes of these systems 
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It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what is meant when we talk about a 
parliamentary system. In most cases fundamental distinctions between and 
presidentialism tend to wash out. For example, separation of powers may create 
more potential for veto players to obstruct policy change than is common in 
parliamentary systems. However the use of multiparty coalitions in parliamentary 
systems serves to internalize veto points in the Council of ministers and executive 
decrees in practice undermine the performance of legislators as veto players in 
many presidential systems. Tsebelis (1995) notes that policy-making in 
parliamentary systems governed by multiparty coalitions shares features with 
presidential system, including a greater number of veto points and greater 
obstacles to policy change. According to Tsebelis: 
A veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is 
required for a policy decision, in presidential systems separately elected 
veto players hold fixed terms and enjoy separate sources of democratic 
legitimacy. Among parliamentary systems the logic of veto point suggest 
that multiparty coalitions will yield a higher number of veto players than 
single party dominant systems. ( Tsebelis, 1995: 290-293) 
 
It may be useful to put a discussion about the role and possibilities of 
parliaments in parliamentary systems. According to some scholars the European 
parliaments are in decline, Vis a Vis the executive and other actors in society 
(Bryce, 1921; King, 1981). Factors such as the percentage of legislation coming 
from the executive, role of the media as a central forum where political debates 
takes place instead of Parliament and the practice of consensual politics, in which 
social organizations play an important role all confirm that parliaments are not 
predominant on the political scene. (Heringa, 1994: 103) 
In the area of law making many dissimilarities exist between various 
counties. In the United Kingdom in which first the parliamentary system emerged, 
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an Act of parliament can do or undo anything. It is claimed that the British concept 
of sovereignty of parliament is an outdated formal description of parliamentarism 
(Smith, 1981). British parliamentary system is described as an “elective 
dictatorship”: Parliament being governed by the majority, the majority of the 
parliament being ruled by the cabinet, and the cabinet being ruled by the Prime 
Minister. Actually accuracy of this description does vary according to the political 
situation and the strength of the position of the Prime Minister (Heringa, 1994: 
105). 
  Decrees having force of law as an institution is a delegated 
legislation of the executive .But it is different  in Anglo-Saxon law because in 
United Kingdom  legislative authority gives up regulation power for a certain 
field and time .In Turkey, according to the 1982 Constitution legislative authority 
enables the executive to change or abolish the legislation or make rules. But at 
the same time the parliament can also make regulations in the same field 
simultaneously. (Ozkol, 1969; Karahanogullari,1998) 
  There are some other institutions in Anglo-Saxon law which are used  
as synonym of decrees having force of law: Subordinate legislation, indirect 
legislation, secondary legislation etc. But all of these notions indicates that it is a 
legislation power of the executive (Karhanogullari, 1998: 250). 
Another case country in relation to decree authority and its expanded 
implementation is a parliamentary regime, Italy. Decrees rather than being 
exceptional measures have become a usual instrument of the legislative process in 
Italy, too. It is claimed that the Italian governments have relied on constitutional 
decree authority because of a lack of dependable support in a highly fragmented 
and undisciplined parliament. Decrees in Italy are a sign of government weakness 
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rather than strength. That’s why decrees have remained an essential feature of 
decision-making in Italy despite attempts throughout the 1980s to strengthen the 
executive (Volcansek, 1999: 99). 
There are two legal bases for the uses of decrees in the Italian legislative 
process: The Constitution and ordinary legislation, which are enacted largely 
within the framework of the parliamentary rules of procedure. In Italy parliament 
in addition to just rejecting or accepting a decree law, amend the original decree. 
Consequently some decrees were converted, some not approved, some died from 
lack of action and others were approved but altered by amendments. Reissueance 
is also a debatable issue in Italian politics. As fewer decree laws are converted 
more are reissued as governments persist in their determination to achieve passage. 
Parliamentary refusal to consider the policy of the decree is not read by the 
government as defeat but rather as a signal to persevere (Kreppel and Sala, 1998 
also Kreppel 1997). 
The Italian governments have endured a period of political fragmentation 
in a legal framework that, despite recent changes has not favored their legislative 
agendas and programs. Legislative decrees have become one of the few responses 
that governments may resort to in an attempt to buttress their fragile legal and 
political bases in the legislative process (Kreppel and Sala, 1998: 184). 
There has been a gradual shift since the early 1980s. This shift has returned 
some control of the agenda to the government or at least to the leadership offices 
in Parliament. This change represents an important shift because the government 
position, which had no standing prior to 1990, is given a weight equal to that of 
parliamentary groups (Krappel, and Sala, 1998: 178). 
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Kreppel (1997) claims that the issuance of decrees alone does not signify 
the expropriation of legislative powers by the executive branch. The Italian case 
demonstrates the relative weakness of the executive in the legislating process and 
relative futility of increased decree usage as a means to equalizing the legislative 
power between the executive and legislature. 
After this short elaboration of empowerment of executive in different 
governmental systems with a particular reference to executive decree authority we 
can look at the Turkish case. First of all legal base of executive decree in Turkey 
will be elaborated in the second chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
2. EMPOWERMENT OF EXECUTIVE IN TURKEY 
 
 
2.1 Historical Background 
In traditional Ottoman rule , there existed no “separation of powers” in the 
contemporary meaning of the concept. All three powers, namely executive 
legislative and judicial powers were concentrated in the hands of the Sultan. Later 
the first (1876-1878) and the second (1908-1918) Constitutional periods witnessed 
a transformation from absolute monarchy toward a constitutional government 
(Genckaya,1990). The Constitution created the assembly and defined its functions. 
A bicameral assembly (Meclis-i Umumi) was established by the 1876 
Constitution. Members of the Chamber of Deputies (Heyet-i Mebusan) were 
elected by the administrative councils and the election committee in the provincial 
capitals sandjacks and districts. The Senate ( Heyet-i Ayan) having limited 
influence in decision –making process was appointed by the Sultan . 
The Sultan was defined as the head of the excutive having rights to appoint 
and dismiss the ministers. The Sultan was given superiority in the excutive branch. 
Later the amendments of 1876 Constitution in 1909 brought a constitutional and 
limited monarchical governmental system ( Ozbudun,1978; Tanor, 1992). During 
late Ottoman  rule executive also exercised executive decree authority. 
Executive decree authority , which is a initial part of the analysis of 
rationalization of parliament  was first introduced to the Ottoman-Turkish politics 
by the Article 36 of 1876 Constitution. According to the article  if the general 
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assembly is not convened and time is not enough to summone the Assembly to 
enact law, which is necessary to protect violation of public order ,the  Council of 
ministers can enact decrees with the approval of the Sultan. These decrees cannot 
be in violation of Constitution and will be in effect until the decision of Assembly 
(Ozbudun,1993). 
After the defeat of Ottoman Empire in the I. World War the national 
independence movement started and GNA of Turkey was established under the 
leadership of Ataturk on April 23, 1920. In the 1921 Constitution , the assembly 
was empowered to exercise all three powers as superior organ. Due to the war 
conditions the speaker of the assembly was one of the striking elements 
(Genckaya, 1990: 45). 
Following the establisment of Turkish Republic, a new Constitution, 1924 
Constitution, was drafted and approved. In the 1924 Constitution the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey was entitled as the sole body to exercise the national 
sovergenity. Executive and legislative powers belonged to the Assembly. The 
Assembly exercised legislative power directly. It also exercised executive power 
by means of the President and the Council of ministers, which was elected by the 
President himself. Compared to the 1921 Constitution the executive was separated 
from legislative to some extend, but equipped with necessary powers that would 
make it independent( Ozbudun, 1978 : 50). Both the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions 
established the GNA  as the main pillar of the system. 
President was defined as the head of the state having no responsibility in 
parliament or executive.  Power` s of the President in the system of 1924 
Constitution was symbolic. But charisma and historical personality of the 
Presidents, Ataturk  and Inonu made them powerful in the system, Also politics 
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with no opposition and hegemony of single party reflected the parliamentary 
procedure. From 1923 to 1950 the power, which dominated the Turkish political 
structure was Republican Peoples party and its social base, military-bureaucratic 
elite. The 1924 Constitution was in practice for about 37 years during both the 
single party regime led by the Republican People’s Party and early in the multi-
party era. For almost two decades a “ theoretically all-powerful GNA” was 
controlled by RPP and institutionalized under its tutelage (Ozbudun, 1987: 39). 
During the single party years there were steps towards a multi-party 
regime. But until 1946 it was not achieved During the 1940s, particularly during 
war years , Inonu acted like national chief . There were of course parliament and 
Council of ministers but in actual fact, with few ministers himself conducted 
foreign policy. Inonu was also close in certain domestic issues that he considered 
important for the contry. The transition to democracy was going gradual and 
initially it was to be kept within certain limits. (Erogul,1970: 123) This meant that 
despite some significant steps towards democratization were initiated the political 
power was still concentrated in the hands of the party elite. 
The successive parliaments of the newly established multi-party regime 
were dominated by majority of Democrat Party, which was established by Celal 
Bayar in 1946. For this period until the entrance of executive decree in to the 
Turkish lawin 1971 the executive authority could issue a special kind of decree 
which was called “norm creating decree” (kaide kararname). The most typical 
examples of these decrees were issued in framework of the Act for Maintaining the 
Value of Turkish Currency (Turk Parasinin Kiymetinin Korunmasi Hakkinda 
Kanun) and The National Defence Law (Milli Korunma Kanunu) 
(Karahanogullari, 1998: 42). 
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The National Defence Law was passed in 1940 ,giving the government 
almost unlimited powers to fix prices. This law responded to the need of 
regulation, which War conditions required. And the social life was regulated by 
these decrees. Turkey managed to remain neutral and stay out of the war until the 
very end , but in order to do so she increased her army. Feeding and equipping this 
army brought tremendous economic strains. The government used its powers given 
by this law during the Second World War to control prices (Ahmad, 1993: 209-
210). 
However, Democrat Party (DP) came to the power firmly convinced that 
free competition without any restraints from the government would produce rapid 
economic growth. The prime minister Adnan Menderes, the champion of a laissez- 
faire system, was forced to reintroduce this law, one of the most interventionist 
laws of the Republic. In the late 1950s authoritarian politics of DP prepared road 
to the 1960 intervention, which followed by a new Constitution. The anti-
democratic measures taken by the DP against the opposition members, increasing 
economic constraints, and the deteriorating relations between the government and 
the public bureaucracy convinced the military officers to intervene (Ozbudun, 
1989: 201). 
The 1961 Constitution brought a flexible separation of powers. In a 
parliamentary system executive and legislative brances coexist and the former 
needs  the latter’s continuous confidence and support. The former normally 
emerges from and is responsible to the latter. This is what flexible separation of 
powers means. According to the Constitution, the executive branch had two heads, 
both emerging from the legislature. The president is the head of the state and is 
equipped with rather symbolic powers. For the 1924 and 1961 Constitutions 
 29 
essential union of executive and legislative branches is accompanied by the 
constitutional principle that parliament is supreme. Like other parliamentary 
systems in Turkey supremacy of parliament is theorethical and the Council of 
ministers holds a centrality in the politics (Yucekok, 1983: 205). Actually the 
Turkish constitution makers did not want to authorize the executive with extensive 
power for governmental activities as a reaction to the of abuse of governmental 
power during 1950s  In a parliamentary regime there must be a division of labor 
and flexible separation of power. In the 1924 and the 1961 Constitutions the 
supremacy of the parliament and was the major principle, therefore the 1924 and 
the 1961 Constitutions did not include executive decree as an institution. 
During the1961-1965 period it was the first time a coalition government 
established in Turkish parliamentary experience a coalitions period started in 
Turkish parliamentary experience. In this era the executive branch was not 
independent from control of the parliament Altoughthe legislative branch was 
given supremacy by the Constitution, due to the fact that the political parties 
remained cohesive and had inner discipline the executive was effective on the 
parliament (Yucekok, 1983: 208). 
One of the important deficiencies of the 1961 Constitution is claimed to be 
not providing any constitutional solutions to deadlocks which arose between the 
executive and legislative powers.(Turhan,1983: 171 also Tanor,1992: 93) Indeed,  
except for the period of 1965-1971 during when a majority government was in 
force, coalitions based on weak and floating parliamentary majority, minority 
governments , rapid governmental changes led governments to be less effective 
than they actually are (Genckaya, 1994 :93 also Tanor,1992:19-24). 
 30 
The process of empowering the executive in Turkish politics started with 
the constitutional amendments made in 1971 and 1973. The 1971 amendments 
brought the institution of decrees having force of law to the Article 64 of 1961 
Constitution. According to the statement of reasons of the amendment, in a 
parliamentary regime law-making requires long time because of procedures, which 
must be adopted by parliament. As a result of modern state understanding some 
rules must be adopted outside of these procedures as a consequence of changing 
economic and social conditions. 
This trend appears to weaken the parliaments being as decision –makers 
and reduce their role to supervise the executive branch, which has been getting 
stronger. Tanilli (1990) calls these developments as parliamentarism with no 
parliament accompanies with no demos. 
 
2.2  Empowerment of Executive under the 1982 Constitution 
 
Following the military intervention the executive was enabled powerful in 
Turkey, like most of the Latin American countries 1980 military intervention had 
the intention to create a strong executive . They had come to identify the pre-1980 
ills with the weakness of the executive resulting from 1961 Constitution. The 
intention of the intervening generals was to establish all mechanisms necessary to 
ensure the orderly and harmonious functioning of the system so as not to feel 
compelled to intervene once again (Heper, 1987, 57). 
Kenan Evren, the head of the National Security Council underlined this 
point and explained the solution when he was addressing to the nation: 
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“That the executive , which carried the whole load of the state and everyday 
life was, despite all its vital significance pushed to the back and was made 
unworkable. As long as the executive was left to that from being like a man 
one leg absent and walk with a stick”( quoted in Ozbudun, 1993: 39) 
 
This speech explains why the executive no longer defined in terms of 
“function” or “duty” only as in the 1961 Constitution but also of power in the 
Article 8 of 1982 Constitution. Morover in the statement of reason of the Article 8, 
it is written that 
According to the regulation of 1961 Constitution the executive branch was 
subject to the legislature. But actually in modern life, the executive is the brain of 
the state and engine of the action power. So that executive power and legislative 
power are regulated in the 1982 Constitution as such having almost equal weight 
(Dickol and Akad , 1998, 250). 
According to Ozbudun (1993) it is not a reasonable argument that since the 
1961 Constitution accepted the executive as the duty, the governments exercised 
less political authority in the 1970s. It is not acceptable to reformulate the position 
of the executive on the basis of this argument of the new Constitution. Therefore 
the wording of the Constitution has no political consequence. 
When the Consultative Assembly and National Security Council were 
preparing the 1982 Constitution, they thought the weakness of the executive was 
reason for the acts of violence before the coup detat. In order to prevent these 
actions and terrorism, the constitutive power decided to create a powerful 
executive. But what they did was different from the wave in Western democracies. 
In Western parliamentary regimes the government especially the prime minister 
was enabled powerful. 
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As it is said before in parliamentary regimes the executive has two heads. 
The president is the head of the state and is equipped with rather symbolic powers 
and represents the politically and impartial wing of the executive branch. The 
actions, which he or she undertakes requires approval by the prime minister and 
ministers. This is called the principle of counter signature (Turhan, 1989: 51-52). 
Contrary to the western democracies in 1982 Constitution the president is 
empowered to share the executive power and duty. The list of the powers given to 
the president shows that 1982 Constitution in comparison to 1961 Constitution 
created a stronger presidential office. 
The strengthening within the structure of the executive branch in general, 
and of the office of the president in particular, while remaining loyal to the “ spirit 
of parliamentary government” was the generals` main aim. But this aim denotes a 
paradoxical novelty. On the one hand, the creation of a stronger president is a 
deviation from parliamentarism, on the other hand however, the executive and 
legislative agencies have been redefined on the basis of the equality and in a way 
to ensure their cooperation (Turhan, 1989: 93-101 ). 
 
2.2.1 The Constitutional Power` s of the Turkish President 
The president in his capacity as the head of the state is given the duty to 
represent the Republic of Turkey and unity of the nation. He oversees the 
implementation of the Constitution and the regular and harmonious functioning of 
the branchs of the state (Article 104)  Besides these  symbolic powers of the 
president thre are some more significant powers the president was entitled to 
exercise. 
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According to the Article 105, there are decisions stated in the Constitution 
and in relevant laws that the president may undertake unilaterally without need for 
counter signature. For example, the president does not need counter signature 
when he or she dissolves the parliament when the conditions in the Article 116 
exists. 
The system is no longer plainly parliamentary because the president does 
not need counter signature when he summons the Assembly into session during 
recess; when he or she deems it necessary appeals to the Constitutional Court for 
the annulment of laws, DFL; submits to a referendum legislation regarding the 
amendment of the Constitution. He exercises all these powers as the chief of the 
state, and not as the chief of the executive yet neither is symbolic nor ceremonial 
(Guler,1994: 24). Also, according to Article 121 of the Constitution the Council of 
ministers meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic is 
granted power to issue decrees on matters made imperative by the state of martial 
law. Besides the President of the Republic is entitled to regulate the establishment, 
the Principles of organization, functioning and appointment of the General 
Secretariat of the Presidency of Republic by presidential decrees (Article 107). 
And no application is possible to be made judicial authorities including 
Constitutional Court for those decisions and orders, which the president signs on 
his own initiative. 
Another article is very vital to understand the role of the presidents in the 
post-1980 period is Article 89 according to which the president shall refer to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for further consideration the laws, 
which he deems unsuitable for promulgation together with a statement of his or her 
reasons. With this power the president can warn the parliament to reconsider a law 
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before the promulgation. But this is not a veto power. Because in constitutional 
law veto means right of the president not to approve a law. The right to return laws 
is related to legislative duties of the president. But it does not mean that the 
president shares the legislative power. And it is not a law proposal too 
(Aliefendioglu, 1988, 15). 
Especially in Kenan Evren`s presidency this power used very frequently. 
18 laws referred back in this era and parliament amended most of the laws referred 
back according to Evren`s statement of reason (Aliefendioglu, 1988: 18). 
However, the exercise of this power can cause conflict between the 
president and the parliament. The president should have the right to appeal the 
Constitutional Court for laws to oversee the implementation of the constitution. 
Morover, giving such a right to an impartial and irresponsible agency is contrary to 
the logic of parliamentarism and goes beyond the balance of power in a 
parliamentary democracy. 
Before making a whole assessment of the executive within the system of 
1982 Constitution, it may be useful to deal with the politically responsible wing of 
the executive, namely the council of ministers. 
 
2.2.2 The Council of Ministers under 1982 Constitution 
The council of ministers is composed of the prime minister and a number 
of Ministers. In the 1982 Constitution , it is evident that the prime minister , real 
head of the executive has also been strengthened. 
According to the Article 109, the ministers shall be nominated by the prime 
minister and appointed by the President of the Republic. And they can be 
dismissed by the President of the Republic upon the proposal of the prime minister 
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when deemed necessary. Since the prime minister can dismiss the ministers he is 
no longer primus inter pares, which is to say that the system of the government 
established by the Constitution is a deviation from the classical parliamentary 
theory. This provision grants important power especially in coalition governments. 
According to the Article 112, the prime minister is the chairman of the 
council of ministers, and the members of the council of ministers are jointly 
responsible for the implementation of the government policy. This was the same in 
the previous Constitution but in addition now each minister is also responsible to 
the prime minister. In this way, prime minister` s primacy is emphasized in the 
Constitution (Turhan, 1990:159). 
Does the 1982 Constitution give executive the right to regulate an area, 
which has not been regulated by law before? There are various articles in the 
Constitution, which give executive power as a founding authority. Real importance 
of defining executive as power appears in the state of emergency and martial law. 
During the state of emergency, the council of ministers meeting under the 
chairmanship of the President may issue decrees having force of law on matters 
necessitated by the state of emergency. Also the council of ministers has the power 
to change the exemption, rates of obligations like tax, impost and expenses 
determined by laws. Act for Maintaining the Value of Turkish Currency is the 
typical example of this type of power, which is given to the government. 
The frequent use of decrees after 1980s caused a new constitutional 
dilemma. It is claimed that Grand National Assembly has been a state of lack of 
legacy. Because, it became dysfunctional with its law-making duty. 
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2.3 Legal Statue of the DFLs 
There are two basic views about the legal statue of the decrees having force 
of law in the Turkish constitutional and administrative law. The first view sees 
decrees originating from the extra-ordinary regulatory power of the executive 
branch. The second view sees decrees formally (organically) executive regulation, 
but functionally legislative regulations. 
Regulative acts of executive (düzenleyici işlem) are the administrative 
regulations, which put general and abstract rules. If we use the organic criterion we 
have to characterize decrees as administrative acts. Because, this criterion 
considers the branch, which makes the rule. But decrees have the power to change 
laws and this prevents to see them as regulative acts (Karatepe, 1995 120-125). 
The Executive branch legislates by decrees. It is claimed that the term legislator 
used in Constitution now includes not only Assembly but also executive branch. 
Both in the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions the authority to issue decrees 
belongs to the council of ministers. The difference of these two Constitutions is 
that according to the 1982 Constitution there is not an obligation to show which 
laws shall be abolished by decrees in authorization law. But the authorization law 
shall define whether more than one decree will be issued within the same period. 
And if the authorization law does not define the purpose, scope, principles and 
operative period of the decree having force of law, this law will be in violation of 
Constitution. Decrees having force of law, which are based on these laws must be 
considered as contrary to Constitution even if they don’t have any article, which is 
contrary to Constitution. But Constitutional Court does not give a conclusive 
decision about the effect of annulment of authorization law on decrees, which are 
based on that law (Ozbudun, 1993). 
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Authorization law designates the scope of the decree. TGNA can only give 
authority to issue decree for a specific area. It cannot authorize the Council of 
ministers to regulate every area. And the subject of decree cannot go beyond the 
scope, which is defined in authorization law. 
The Constitution also designates the areas, which cannot be regulated by 
decrees. Fundamental rights, individual rights and duties included in the first and 
second chapter of the second part of the Constitution and the political rights and 
duties listed in the fourth chapter cannot be regulated by decrees having force of 
law except during periods of martial law and states of emergency. 
Fazıl Sağlam (1984) at this point claims that regulation is a concept, which 
is different from and broader than restriction. There are regulations, which can 
strengthen the rights. Most of the social and economic rights and duties require the 
state to take measures and establish necessary organizations. That’s why these 
rights could be regulated by decrees having force of law. 
During the recent years the Constitutional Court added new requirements 
like necessity, importance and urgency in relation to subject of decrees. According 
to Constitutional Court issuing decrees is a power, which can only be used in 
urgent and necessary situations. Ozbudun (1989) claims that the source of 
necessity to authorize executive branch to issue decree is not only urgency but also 
in most time technical hardship of the regulations for legislatures. The 
Constitutional Court reduces the scope of authority of executive to issue decrees 
through interpretation. And he claims that enlargement of executive regulations 
cannot be considered as an anti-democratic process. Parliaments have the power to 
control the process of regulation by decrees. 
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Authorization law and DFLs, which were issued accordingly, shall be 
discussed in the committees and in the plenary session of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly with priority and urgency. But the 1982 Constitution does not 
designate a forcible time period to discuss and decide about these decrees. 
DFL in Turkish system as an ordinary law is subject to both parliamentary 
approval and constitutional review When parliament enables the executive through 
authorizing law, the executive can issue decrees in the framework of this given 
power. Scholars often argue that the parliamentary control of the decrees is slow 
and insufficient. As important as the accountability issue, whether or not this 
power increases the effectiveness of the executive branch and policy stability of 
the political system in Turkey needs to be elaborated. 
For a whole analysis two control player, namely the Constitutional Court 
and the parliament must be considered together in this decision making process. 
However it should be noted that control of the executive can be operated by few 
actor. 
For example the president promulgates the laws adopted by the TGNA 
within fifteen days. He shall within the same period refer to the TGNA for further 
consideration laws, which he deems unsuitable for promulgation. As we said 
before it is not a veto power. But there is no regulation related to promulgation of 
decrees having force of law. Since there is no forcible time or obligation for the 
promulgation procedure of the DFLs the president can veto the decrees having 
force of laws. Then president becomes another control player, which is not stated 
in the Constitution. The other ways of control of executive decrees will be 
elaborated in the third chapter of the thesis with special reference to Constitutional 
Court’s decisions. 
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                             CHAPTHER III 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE DFLs IN THE POST_1980 PERIOD 
 
 
The causes of breakdown of democracy in Turkey on September 12, 1980 
were multi-faced. World economic crisis, inward oriented development policies, 
which were implemented during 60s and 70s by Turkey were the economic factors 
accelerating the breakdown of democracy in Turkey in the end of 70s. Political 
polarization and fragmentation also played an important role in the crisis, which 
Turkey experienced during this period. 
The decline of industrial production and pressure of foreign dept were only 
few of the many problems Turkey was facing in the seventies. Like other oil 
importing states, Turkey developed substantial resource gap following the oil price 
increases during the late 70s. High government spending, stagnant domestic 
savings, the inward-oriented development strategies, poor dept management and 
political unrest were the crucial internal factors lead to crisis of industrialization in 
Turkey (Yeşilada and Fisunoğlu, 1992, 185). 
Political instability was a defining element of this period. Five elections 
were held but no party achieved a parliamentary majority. Power shifted back and 
forth a half dozen times between two major parties which were able to govern only 
after entering fragile coalitions with Turkey’s many small splinter parties. Political 
support in Turkey during 1970s was very much at premium. Each party had little 
concern for the longer-term consequences of its policies. Not surprisingly brought 
segments of the Turkish population gradually lost confidence in all politicians. 
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The year 1980 was a turning point in the political economy of Turkish 
politics. The structural change in Turkish economy started with the package of 
January 24, 1980. There was a movement to replace ISI (import substitution 
industrialization) with an export-oriented model. Although the new economic 
policies were tried to be implemented at the beginning of 1980s before the coup 
Justice Party government could not follow an effective and resolute course (Hale, 
1981: 34). 
In September 1980 the chief of the general staff and five top armed forces’ 
commanders seized the power. This new regime followed the economic reform 
policies, which were not put into effect before the coup. However during this 
period the commanders left the decisions on the economic policies to the Prime 
Minister’s office. This new economic program, January 24 package, was under the 
responsibility of the Deputy Prime Minister Özal (Ildan, 1991, 17). 
In January 24 package there were regulations, which ensure centralization 
of economic decision making channels. Committee of Money and Credit (Para 
Kredi Kurulu) was established through a cabinet decision (8/166). The chairman of 
this committee (Para Kredi Kurulu) was permanent under secretary of Prime 
Minister’s Office. Also Foreign Capital Department regulated again as subsidiary 
department of Prime Minister’s Office (Ekzen, 1984:180). These regulations 
gathered the decision making power in a one hand. Like Latin American countries 
also in Turkey rulers of 1980s realized that emergency management of the 
economy demands concentration of power in the executive. 
Political and economic instability and social unrest and violence were the 
characteristics and reasons lead to the 1980 military intervention. Political and 
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economic crisis have been initial determining factors in Turkish politics. Crisis 
does not mean only a destruction or disorganization; they are at the same time 
instruments for new regulations. New regimes and institutions are generally 
established by means of crisis. What determines the formation of political –
constitutional systems and institutions is a dialectical reaction to the crisis 
(Caglar, 1989: 90). 
As an important mechanism to ensure the concentration of power in the 
executive decrees having force of law was introduced to our law following a crisis. 
And another crisis caused the frequent use of this way of legislation. After 1980s it 
can be observed that there is a sharp increase in the number of the decrees issued 
by the governments. To reveal the role of DFLs in post 1980s Turkish politics I am 
going to deal with the major areas regulated by decrees. Militay rule, Ozal era and 
Ciller era will be my unit of analysis in which executive decree authority exercised 
very frequently. 
 
3.1 Major Areas Regulated by DFLs 
3.1.1The military rule (21. 09.1980- 13.12. 1983) 
During the military rule five authorization laws were enacted and 91 
decrees having force of law issued accordingly. 
The law no. 2578 (Official Gazette (O.G.), 13.1.1982) concerned with 
money brokers and bankers who were in financial difficulty. The 13 decrees were 
issued related to this matter and these decrees established legislation for the de 
facto situation. 
The law no. 2680(O.G, 19.6.1982) concerned with the regulation of public 
institutions and foundations. The 108 decrees having force of law issued according 
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to the permission and limit of the authorization law4. The Board of Higher 
Education, the ministries, the State Economic Enterprises like Emlak Bank, Halk 
Bank, the Turkish Electricity Institution were the most regulated areas trough these 
decrees. The military regime established the Board of Higher Education. The 
disciplining of the universities was influenced by the past experience of 
politicization and polarization. The military planned not only appointments and 
promotions, but also day-to-day working of the universities (Heper, 1985: 143). 
The 18 decrees issued based on authorization law no. 2767(O.G., 
3.12.1983) concerning the profession chambers. Also 4 decrees issued related to 
Money and Capital markets based on the authorization law no 2810. Act of Banks, 
Act of Central Bank and Act of Capital market were amended by these decrees. 
Government explained its aim as supervising capital and money markets in an 
efficient and immediate way through these decrees. These decrees are also 
indicators of concentration of decision–making power related to economy, which 
was a policy implemented starting with the January 24 decisions. (Decree no. 
90(O.G., 6.10.1983) regulated the process of lending money, the decree 91 
(O.G.6.10.1983) subjected markets of portfolio, which had been established or 
shall be established. The decree 92 (O.G.6.10.1983) regulated the functions and 
powers of the Central Bank and amended the article 40 of the act, which concerns 
the legal collaterals) 
The last authorization law concerned state of emergency and 20 decrees 
were issued based on this authorization law no 2935. 
 
                                                          
  The following government, Ozal Government, also used this authority given by this 
authorization law. Ozal government issued 52 decrees based on this law according to the Article 91 
of the 1982 Constitution  
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3.1.2 Turgut Ozal Era (1983-1991) 
After transition to civilian politics in November 1983, the military allowed 
Turgut Ozal and his party to participate in the elections when Ozal won the 
majority of the votes in the 6 November 1983 elections the military let him form 
the government, too. The philosophy of the Motherland Party, which was the 
champion of the economic adjustment program, was state’s retreat from the 
economy in the course of liberalization and privatization. Also shrinking of the 
state was another policy implemented through this era. Reconstruction of economy 
was achieved mostly by decrees having force of laws. 
The first authorization law promulgated was related to reduction of red tape 
in this era. The aim of this law was explained as promotion of efficiency and 
reduction of the cost of public services. (Law no, 2977 O.G. 8.2.1984) the duration 
of this law was extended two times through new authorization laws. 
The second authorization law granted permission to amend the acts related 
to public servants and other public employees. Especially the fiscal and social 
rights of the public servants were regulated by these decrees 
The Law no. 3268(O.G. 19.3.1986) also amended the Act of Public 
Servants and Law of Turkish Military, Act of Higher Education Council, Act of 
Judges and Prosecutors. The Government issued decrees concerning public 
foundations, public institutions and their organization, cadres, functions and 
powers. Another authorization law no, 3347 (O.G. 17.4 1987) granted the 
government to regulate the same domain, latter. 
In 1983, the Motherland Party government first attempted to change the 
administrative structure of the state and then followed the policies to adopt the 
administration to the free market economy. The Ozal government’s policies rooted 
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from the military rule. In the late months of 1980, the civilian government 
submitted its program to National Security Council. In that program, the civil 
bureaucracy was mentioned as constituting an obstacle to economic development 
(Heper, 1990, 220). The government followed a similar program and attempted to 
restructure the bureaucracy. As the new strategy of development placed greater 
emphasis on the market forces the bureaucracy had to be taken out of the decision 
making process. 
Ministries were the first administrative department, which have been 
regulated by decrees. For example the authority of the Ministry of Finance were 
separated. The responsibility of treasury was given to the Undersecretary of Prime 
Ministers Office. Then the Ozal government reduced the number of ministries and 
some of the ministries were united by the decree no. 178 (O.G. 14.12.1983) 
Finance and Customs Ministries were joined by this decree and the decree no. 185 
combined the Industry and Trade Ministries. 
The Undersecretary of Treasury and Foreign Trade were established and 
affiliated to the Prime Ministry according to the decree no. 188. (O.G., 
14.12.1983) This also contributed to the centralization of power in the hands of the 
Prime Minister’s Office in economic and financial sectors. Consequently the Prime 
Ministry started to serve for economic and fiscal administration of the country 
through its increased affiliated and subsidiary institutions in charge of economic 
affairs. 
The State Planning Organization (SPO), which has originally been 
affiliated to the Prime Ministry, was regulated by decree no. 233 (O.G.18.6. 
1984,18435). The prime minister could use this administrative power by means of 
a minister without portfolio.  According to this decree, the superior decision agent 
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of the SPO was the Supreme Planning Board. By including more higher 
bureaucrats having signature power into the SPO the red tape was lessened 
through these regulations, because the procedures were taking time for investors. 
The government made this power more prevalent. And also procedures regulating 
the Encouragement Measures were made simpler and faster for investors. 
The policies, which were implemented by Ozal first required the shrinking 
of the state. Following the serious attempts at privatization the government took 
several steps to prepare the legal institutional framework, which was not regulated 
by the Turkish Constitution 
 
3.1.2.1Privatization 
Privatization is normally one of several parallel policies in the context of 
structural readjustment or systemic transition (Luciani, 1997: 115). Privatization 
includes all types and increments of transfer of ownership, partial or complete 
from the government to the private sector. But the defense industries and 
electricity generation and distribution are typical examples of state monopoly 
sectors, even in many advanced capitalist societies.  In a majority of cases, 
privatization is a policy, which is first considered at times when the government is 
facing a fiscal crisis. 
The sale of state enterprises to private buyers in the 1980s and 1990s was 
the newest policy to rescue national economies as diverse as slow growth 
advanced industrial countries of the west, Latin America and East Europe. 
In Turkey the first regulation on privatization policies was a decree having 
force of law, which was put into force in May 1983(no: 60, O.G. 20.5.1983). This 
regulation became an act in September 1983 (2983, Act of Promotion of Savings 
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and Acceleration of Public Investment). In mid-1984 the Motherland Party 
government amended this act and the DFL no. 233, came into force. But this DFL 
was not quite different from the philosophy of the law no. 2929. According to the 
DFL no. 233 a State Economic Enterprise or subsidiary corporation can be 
established through decision of council of ministers, but can be abolished only by 
Economic Affairs Coordination Committee. This committee consists of eleven 
ministers and four bureaucrats. Also sharing and transferring decisions of the SEEs 
left to the Economic Affairs Coordination Committee. 
The DFL no 233 increased supervision of the Prime Minister’s office. 
According to this DFL, pricing of goods, which were produced by the State 
Economic Enterprises (SEE) can be determined by the council of ministers ,when 
deemed necessary. This means intervention authority of central government is 
preserved. 
This decree also excluded subsidiary institutions from the definition of the 
SEE; as a result of these fact subsidiary institutions excluded from the targets of 
the five-year development plans. 
During the 1980s the legal and constitutional vacuum created an obstacle 
for privatization actions. The Constitutional Court annulled most of the decrees 
and laws concerning privatization. (see the part on the Constitutional Courts 
review in chapter 3)   
 
3.1.2.2 Public Employment (Shrinking of the State) 
The decree no. 60 and 233 and the law no. 2929 all stated that legislation 
concerning employees of State Economic Enterprises must be made through law. 
However the first regulation for this area was not a law. A decision of the Supreme 
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Planning Board canceled the vacant cadres of the SEEs and stated that the need of 
employee shall be satisfied through contracting employees. 
The first regulation promulgated in accordance with the decree no. 233 was 
a decree having force of law issued on 5. 1. 1988. (Decree no. 308). The decree no. 
331 (O.G.30.6.1988, no.19873) according to which all public services shall be 
carried out by contracting employees in the SEEs amended this decree (Except for 
the workers). Later the Constitutional Court annulled this decree having force law 
(22 .12. 1988, 88/55). 
Following the annulment decision the decree no. 399 went into force on 
22.01. 1990. This decree also concerned personnel regime of the State Economic 
Enterprises. Later Constitutional Court also annulled some the articles of this 
decree (4.4.1991, 91/7). 
The government issued another decree in accordance with the statement of 
reason of the annulment decision. The decree no. 453(O.G., 16.9.1991,no.20993) 
brought the principle that Act of Public Servants shall be implemented for the 
contracting employees in case the decree does not include any regulation. 
Differences among the statues of the employees gave way to ensure 
different facilities to the doers of the same or similar jobs. The budget laws 
introduced in Ozal era, decrees having force of law and by-laws brought 
restrictions for the number of the employees in the SEEs. It is almost impossible to 
hire new personnel in place of the personnel who resigns or retires. 
There is a continuous decline in the number of the employees of Sees. The 
approximate number of the employee in 1994 was 643.940 and this number 
decreased in five years period  % 17.9 per cent (KIT Genel Raporu, 2000: 150-
160). 
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This decrease was both a result of privatization and the restrictions for 
employing new personnel in place of the retired personnel. But this application did 
not help to solve the problem of inefficiency in the SEEs. Because, while reducing 
the number of the employees; sub-contracting became a new type of employment 
for ensuring of public services (KIT Genel Raporu, 2000: 161). 
Another regulation, which was made in this era about the cadres of public 
employees, stated that creation of new cadres could be possible only through 
parliament’s initiative. The total number of present public servants could only be 
increased through the will of representatives. (Uras, 1993: 93) 
 
3.1.2.3 Finance and Insurance 
According to the decree no. 303 (O.G.21.12.1987) the regulative authority 
and powers, related to the insurance company services transferred from the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry to the Prime Minister’s Office and it was also 
stated that prime minister could use this power by means of a minister without 
portfolio. 
The decree no. 344 (O.G., 25.10.1988) also amended the articles of act of 
Insurance Supervision related to the members of Committee of Supervision. With 
decree no. 368 (O.G., 14.6.1989) all processes related to insurance transferred to 
the Prime Minister’s Office. Another important bank established in this era was 
Eximbank. (Turkish Export Credit Bank) which was in accordance with the 
philosophy of the economic adjustment program. 
Decree no. 13 established the State Industry and Workers Bank (SIWB). 
Decrees 165(O.G.14.11.1983) and 329 (O.G., 15.7.1988) regulated the structure of 
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this bank later. Decree no. 329 gathered two banks Promotion of Tourism Bank 
and SIWB under the roof of a new bank, Turkish Development Bank. This Bank 
was founded to help private sector programs in financial areas, giving investment 
and management loans to private sector organizations In Turkish Development 
Bank share of the treasury was 49 %. The decree no.401 stated that the capital of 
this bank could be increased by decision of Council of Ministers. But government 
shouldn’t have had such an administrative power on this bank simply because 
share of the government was limited and this bank should not have been subject to 
public law. This regulation shows the governments initiation for regulating all 
parts of the economy in accordance with its policies. A similar government 
initiative was seen in the area of natural gas. According to the decree 350 (O.G., 
9.12.1988) BOTAS or private companies would be authorized for allocation and 
purchase of gas. But Prime Minister would approve shares of the private 
companies. The decree 397 (O.G.9.12.1990) amended this decree and gave the 
authority to the Council of ministers. This shows that most of the decrees issued in 
this era gave power of decision or ratification to the Prime Ministry related to 
economic affairs. That’s why the power, functions and organization of Prime 
Ministry became very huge because of these regulations. 
 
3.1.3  Tansu Ciller Era (1993-1996) 
 
The Prime Minister Tansu Ciller came to power after Suleyman Demirel 
was elected to the presidency in 1993. She formed a coalition government with the 
Social Democrat Populist Party and later the Republican Peoples Party under the 
leadership of Deniz Baykal.  
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Privatization was one of the primary considerations of the government 
programs despite some opposition from the leading RPP deputies, namely Mumtaz 
Soysal. Ciller governments attempted to regulate the establishment and operation 
of privatization, banking, public employees and profession chambers. For example 
decree no. 527(O.G., 20.5 1994, 21939) entitled the government to open new 
cadres in the public sector. Court evaluated this decree contrary to the articles 87, 
160 and 161 of the Constitution. 
During this period, most of the authorization laws were annulled by the 
Court and DFLs, which were issued on the basis of these authorization laws. Were 
also found unconstitutional accordingly the Court` s decisions. The major areas 
regulated by decrees in this era will be elaborated in the following part by 
Constitutional Court` s decisions. 
 
3.2 Constitutional Review of the DFLs 
According to the Article 148 of the 1982 Constitution the Constitutional 
Court examines the constitutionality in respect of both form and substance of laws, 
decrees having force of laws and the rules of procedure of the TGNA. 
Constitutional amendments is examined and verified only with regard to their 
form. However, no action can be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging 
the unconstitutionality as the form or substance of decrees having force of law, 
issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in the of war. 
None of the political actors appealed to Constitutional Court until 1989, so 
that we do not count any annulment decision until this year. But after 1990 there is 
a sharp increase in the number of annulment decisions of the Court. This can be 
explained through the Court’s changing interpretation on DFLs after 1990s. 
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The Constitutional Court brought a new interpretation and additional 
criteria related to decrees having force of law by its two decisions ruled out on 
February, 1.1990 and February, 6.1990 and in its following decisions the court 
strengthened and improved its former stand and interpretation by annulling the 
DFLs on the same ground. On 1.2.1990 the Constitutional Court for the first time 
listed this new conditions and used them as statement of reasons of annulment 
decision5. Before this decision the Court also stated a similar interpretation in a 
different decision. But it did not stated as the reason of annulment 6 
According to the Constitutional Court issuing decrees having force of law 
is a subsidiary authority. The executive cannot use it frequently, because this leads 
to delegation of legislative power. 
 
3.2.1. Constitutional Court’s new Criteria Concerning DFLs : 
It is necessary to elaborate the Court` s new criteria on DFls in detail. 
Because after 1990s the Court has become a important check and limitation player 
for the enforcement of decree authority of the governments. 
1. Urgency, Necessity and Frequency. 
According to Constitutional Court issuing decrees having force of law is 
only possible when an important situation occurs and necessitates urgent 
regulation. 
On February 2, 1990 Constitutional Court decided that law on public 
servants couldn’t be considered as an urgent area to be regulated by DFL and the 
DFls was annulled accordingly. 
                                                          
5 (Substance 1988/64. Decision 1990/2. Date of Decision, 1.2.1990 AMKD volume 26 pp.51-94) 
6 S. 1989/4 D 1989/4, DD 16.5.1989 AMKD vol. 25 pp .231-267 
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Moreover, the Court also introduced a new criterion the same issue as 
“frequency”. It was explained that decrees having force of law couldn’t be issued 
to regulate the same area frequently. The Court evaluates the “frequency” principle 
for the DFLs according to the number of the authorization laws, not as to the 
number of decrees having force of law. Indeed extension of duration of 
authorization laws also indicates the frequent use of this authority 
(Karahanoğullari, 1996:126). 
In its decision made on July 5, 1995 the Court decided that the issues 
related to public servants and their organization have been regulated by DFLs 
frequently. And this situation exceeds the aim of decrees having force of law as an 
institution and means usurpation of legislative power, for the reason that, the 
“exception rule” (decrees having force of law), was transformed into “usual” 
procedure 7. 
 
2. Being Short-term. 
According to the Constitutional Court DFL can only be issued for short 
terms. A decision made on February 6, 1990 by Constitutional Court annulled an 
authorization law, which was granted for two-years by considering that two years 
were two long.8 
These decisions indicate that according to the Constitutional Court the 
principal and usual way of legislation is law-making by the parliament. The Court 
put a limit the executive’s authority to issue DFL through its interpretation. Thus 
                                                          
7 ( S. 1994/50. D. 1994 44/2. DD.5.7.1994. O.G. 24.2.1995 vol. 22212 pp.38) 
 
8 S. 1988/62 D. 1990/3. DD 6.2.1990 AMKD vol 26 p.105. 
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the Court evaluated DFL as an exceptional procedure that can be used in somehow 
emergency or urgent situations. 
It is argued that Constitutional Court restated the honor of parliament, 
which had lost before. And the democratic legitimacy of this decisions lays here 
(Çağlar, 1990, 119) 
The other annulment decisions also indicated the negative attitude of the 
Court to the decrees. There is a change in the rationality and interpretation of the 
Court after 1990s. 
 
3.2.2Annulment Decisions Related to Authorization laws: 
It will be explanatory to demonstrate the Court` s important role, limiting 
the authority of issuing DFls of the governments after 1990s  
1.  Law no.34819 Act For Reregulation of Administrative Procedures and Acts 
This authorization law can be regarded as continuation of the law no. 2977, 
which was extended two times. The objective of the law was to reduce red tape. 
However the Constitutional Court in its annulment decision stated that there was 
no correspondence between this objective and the following articles of this law. 
This authorization law granted the government not only to amend the formal rules 
but also to reformulate substance of the regulations and procedures. 
As the statement of reason the Court basically pointed out that this law 
grants unlimited power to government. Most of the decrees, which were issued 
based on the law no. 2977 and 3481, amended various laws, which were not 
related to formal procedures. The Court decided that, the law was unconstitutional 
                                                          
9 21.4. 1990, AMKD 1990/2, Vol. 3 pp.513 
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as being contrary to the articles 87 and 91 of the Constitution and also to the 
principle of democratic- state, which is a characteristic of the Republic. 
 
2. Law no, 3755 Authorization law About Fiscal and Social Rights of Public 
Servants and Other Public Employees10 
This law granted the government to issue decrees in various areas related to 
banking, insurance, social security, privatization and purchasing public real estate. 
The Constitutional Court decided on December 12, 1991 stating a similar 
argument to which was expressed for the annulment decision of law no. 3481.  The 
Court` s decision underlined the fact that the laws offers unlimited authority to the 
government in legislation. Besides the scope of legislation was considered too 
large to be regulated by the executive. 
 
3. Law no.  3390 Authorization law Concerning the Rights of the Public Servants 
and Public Employees11 
This authorization law authorized government to issue decrees related to 
public servants, organization of public administration and some other general 
areas. 
The Constitutional Court considered that the first three articles of the law 
had similar content of law no. 3479 and 3755, which were annulled before. 
Moreover it was also mentioned that the law also granted the government to issue 
decrees amending the Act of Customs, Act of Promotion of Tourism and Act of 
Building Site Office. This was the first time these areas were opened to the 
authority of executive rule making. 
                                                          
10 12. 2, 1991 AMKD, 1991/50 Vol. 4 pp.426 
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By considering the fact that the scope of the law was unlimited, the Court 
stated that executive becomes superior to the legislative branch through usurpation 
of legislation. The Court also repeated the three criteria, which were mentioned 
before for the use of decrees having force of law. 
 
4. Law no. 3911 Authorization law concerning the Acts on Public Servants and 
Public Employees and 3987 Authorization law Concerning the Regulation of 
Privatization Process.12 
These two authorization laws granted the government to regulate 
privatization process. 
The annulment of the law no. 3911 was based on the lack of aim scope and 
principle of authorization law. It was considered by the Court that absence of this 
proper procedure meant delegation of legislative authority. In this respect, the 
Constitutional Court initially states that the aim and scope of the authorization 
laws must be limited and definite. 
The aim of the law no. 3987 is stated as 
 
“The objective of this law is reduction of the number of the authorized 
branches for carrying out privatization policies. Through this the 
government aims at promoting speed and productivity of the privatization 
policies. That is why the government is authorized to make the necessary 
amendments in legislation which constitutes the base of privatization 
policies". 
 
The Law no. 3987 includes privatization of the State Economic Enterprises, 
public establishments and partnerships in which more than half of the capital 
directly or indirectly belongs to the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                
11 5.7.1994 AMKD, 1994/44-2 Vol.5 pp.507 
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Moreover, the law under consideration made the Privatization Fund out of 
the control of the parliament and subject to supervision of the Council of High 
Supervision, which belongs to the prime ministry. The revenues, which would be 
gained out of privatization, would be gathered in this fund. The Constitutional 
Court evaluated that the supervision method, which the laws introduced, was 
contrary to the Articles 160 and 165 of Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court indicated the low level of domestic capital 
accumulation and pointed out the probability of foreign ownership: “the foreign 
ownership of strategic public services like telecommunication and electricity has 
drawbacks for national security, protection and independence.” 
Also, the annulment decision for the law no. 3991, based on the indefinite 
and large scale of authority granted to the government. The Court again evaluated 
the authorization law as contrary to the Articles 87 and 91 of the Constitution. The 
Court pointed out that a total of   80 articles related to the Act of Banking and 
Insurance Supervision to be regulated by DFL went beyond the purpose. 
 
4. Law no. 4109 Authorization Law Concerning the Establishment of New 
Provinces and Districts13 
The aim of this authorization law was determined as to establish new 
provinces and districts according to the necessities of public services and 
economic conditions of the country. 
The Constitutional Court considered that no criterion was determined by 
the law, according to which, the government entitle districts as province and towns 
                                                                                                                                                                
12 8.10.1993 AMKD 1993/28, Vol. 4 pp. 426 and 10.9 1994 AMKD 1994/45-2 Vol.5 pp. 507 
13 6.7.1995 AMKD 1995/26 , Vol.5 pp.557 
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as districts and also establish new administrative departments. The Court 
interpreted the law contrary to the prohibition of delegation of legislative power 
and principle of democratic-state. The Court stated that the aim, scope and 
principles of the law were not definite and limited. Though the law was considered 
to be unconstitutional on the basis of the lack of principles, which were stated in 
the Article 91 of the Constitution. 
The Court mentioned that the law was also unconstitutional on the base of 
the article 127 of the Constitution. According to article 127 the formation, duties 
and powers of the local administration shall be regulated by law in accordance 
with the principle of local administration. 
 
5.  Law no. 4113 Authorization Law Concerning TOBB, the Act of Commerce, 
Geographical Marks and Signs, The Act of Capital Market14 
Another authorization law, which was annulled by the Constitutional Court, 
granted the government to issue DFL to amend almost everything related to Act of 
Capital Market 
In the annulment decision the Court again based on the lack of aim and 
indefiniteness of principles of the authorization law. The Court evaluated the 
authorization law contrary to the articles of 7,11 and 91 of the Constitution. 
These annulment decisions show the attitude of the Constitutional Court to 
the decrees having force of law. The Court initially states that the scope and 
principles of the authorization law must be definite and in most of the decisions 
the Court gives reference to the Article 7 of the Constitution, which is related to 
the prohibition of the delegation of legislative power. 
                                                          
14 3.11.1995 AMKD 1995/44, vol. 5 pp.568 
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The Court’s reasons give preference to legislate by law than decrees having 
force of law. It does not welcome the use of decrees by government frequently.  
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VI CONCLUSION 
 
The trend of empowerment of executive and rationalization of parliaments 
starting after World War II, which has been reinvented after 1980s with the impact 
of global market economy, can be considered as an outcome of the redefinition of 
states` role in the global context. 
Especially newly established democracies after 1980s preferred presidential 
systems, in which the presidents are central policy making actors. In presidential 
systems the executives tends to be controlled by single parties and sometimes even 
by individuals with weak or no connections to political parties (Linz, 1994). 
Executive decrees are the regular and frequently used policy making mechanism is 
in these systems. It is evident that legislatures are being marginalized. It is a tool 
sometimes systematically used by executives to implement policies for which they 
lack legislative support. 
The argument supporting empowerment of executive gives emphasize on 
fastening the decision-making process. Legislative procedures are frequently slow, 
whereas the need to implement new policies, which global economy requires 
might be pressing. Presidential decrees have played a central role in most of the 
Latin American countries also in Russia during economic adjustment period. Some 
of the issues, which have heavy social costs are regulated through decrees as we 
have said parliaments have fear of not to be elected. 
It is also the case that where executives exercise influence over the process 
of constitution building and amending, they tend to secure greater constitutional 
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decree authority than when assemblies dominates constitution building, such 
executives institutionalize greater discretion over policy relative to legislatures 
(Carey and Shugart, 1998). 
In parliamentary systems, too empowerization of executives occurs. It is 
claimed that where executives appear strong or even dominant in parliamentary 
systems it is almost always because of consistent, disciplined party support in the 
legislatures. But this argument ignores the growing emergency powers given to the 
executives. To use such powers executives do not need authorization from 
parliaments. A vast range of open-ended emergency delegation of power to the 
executive concerned not only war preparedness and natural disasters but also many 
areas of economic regulation. These developments considered being present ills of 
the liberal democracies.  Rule by exceptional power indicates no ongoing 
relationship exists between those who make decisions and those who live under 
them (Schuerman, 1999). This is the major output of the process of empowerment 
of executive and /or rationalization of the parliaments in relation to democratic 
theory 
In the Turkish political system, DFLs despite their widespread use they do 
not have an impact as in the presidential systems to define or change the character 
of the political system. However, as it is mentioned before executive decree 
authority is used by the executives either president or government has important 
effect in decision- making process. The executives take control of important 
regulation areas and set a broad policy. And it is claimed that these developments 
threaten the representative government systems (Prezeworski, 1991, Linz, 1994, 
Schuerman, 1999). 
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In relation to the main research question of this thesis, which is impact of 
decrees having force of law in Turkish politics, there are problems deriving from 
enforcement of DFLs by the governments. The first problem is that governments 
issued DFLs following one another and regulating the same domain. As a result 
before the discussion of a DFL in the parliament, another DFL replaces it or 
amends its articles. This enforcement prevents the parliament to imply its initiative 
on the DFLs. (Tan, 1995). Another problem is that the principles and rules, which 
are defined by the Constitution for DFLs are not properly exercised. Although the 
clear statement of the Article 91 of the Constitution DLS and authorization laws 
are not discussed in the committees and in the plenary session of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly with priority and urgency. The widespread use of DFLs 
cannot be explained by the difficulties in the law-making process. Because, we see 
the frequent use of DFLs during majority government periods. This means that 
governments have the adequate parliamentary support to legislate through law. 
Because of the fact that, governments escape from the parliamentary control by 
legislating through DFLs this way of rule –making is preferred. Governments take 
control of the decision making process by means of improper exercise of rules 
regulating DFLs. Finally as the Constitutional Court states the exceptional way of 
rule making becomes the usual way.  
As we have stated in the third chapter of the thesis Constitutional Court 
developed new criteria on the constitutionality of the DFLs. By its new 
interpretation the Court presented its negative attitude to the enforcement of the 
DFLs in rule-making process. The Court` s annulment decisions can be considered 
as a response to the improper exercise of parliamentary control over the DFLs. 
However, by annulling almost all of the decrees, which came before it, the 
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Constitutional Court restricted the authority of issuing DFL by the governments. 
The Court has been an important control player and its interpretation has 
determined the enforcement of decree authority in the post -1990s period. 
As it is mentioned before the president can also became a control player for 
the promulgation of the DFLs. Because unlike the promulgation of laws, the 
regulation of the Constitution, concerning the DFLs does not determine a forcible 
time period for the promulgation of them. As an outcome of this regulation the 
president can become a veto player for the DFLs, which can cause a conflict 
between the two heads of the executive. 
As a conclusion it can be claimed that in Turkish political system, like the 
other parliamentary regimes, where decree authority exists, impact of DFLs 
depend on the balance of power among the different institutions of the system. 
Turkish case demonstrated that even majority governments could prefer to 
legislate by DFLs rather than general laws. In the light of the analysis made in the 
third chapter of the thesis we can say that governments frequently used DFLs to 
ensure the centralization of power in the executive, more specifically in the hands 
of the Prime Ministry. Especially the DFls, which were issued in the Turgut Ozal 
period, gathered the powers on the economic affairs in the prime ministry. 
 Nevertheless due to the fact that the 1982 Constitution created a powerful 
presidential office and the Constitutional Court customarily give preference to 
legislate by general laws; impact of DFLs in the decision making process can 
differ according to the balance of power among these institutions. 
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Table 1.1 
Types of Decrees 
Country Agent Scope 
 
 
Supervision Time 
restriction 
Argentina 
CDA 
President Public 
emergency 
Supreme court Limited time 
period for its 
effectiveness 
Argentina 
DDA 
President All issues 
except for penal 
,fiscal and 
political party 
matters 
Supreme court 
and Congress 
(pass a special 
act by the 
positive vote of 
the majority 
will determine 
the 
proceedings 
and effects of 
the congress on 
decrees) 
Ten days for 
submission. 
Russia DDA President Any subject as 
long as they 
don’t contradict 
existing law or 
the Constitution 
Constitutional 
Court 
No time 
restriction 
Russia 
CDA 
President Any subject as 
long as they 
don’t contradict 
existing 
legislation 
Constitutional 
Court 
( do not require 
any 
confirmation 
by assembly) 
No time 
restriction 
Venezuela 
CDA 
President Extraordinary 
measures on 
issues of 
economics and 
finance in cases 
of emergency 
and creation of 
new public 
services 
Congress( in 
case the 
measures are 
limited to 
detention of the 
relevant 
individuals 
must be 
submitted to 
the 
consideration 
of Congress 
within ten 
days) 
No time 
restriction 
Venezuela 
DDA 
Président Any subject Constitutional 
Court 
No time 
restriction 
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Table 1.2 
Country Agent Scope Supervision Time 
restriction 
France DDA Government The domain 
out of the 
article 34 of 
the 
Constitution. 
( Constitution 
defines the 
law-making 
area) 
Supreme Court 
of 
Administration 
No time 
restriction, 
authorizing law 
defines the 
time for 
submission 
France CDA President emergency  No time 
restriction 
Italy (CDA) Government The areas 
required by 
necessity and 
urgency 
Assembly Decrees lose 
effect if they 
are not 
converted into 
law   in 60 days 
after their 
publication 
(but 
governments 
issue recycled 
versions of 
earlier decrees 
that expired 
after 60 days) 
Italy DDA Government No restriction 
Authorizing 
law 
determines 
the regulation 
areas 
Assembly 
Constitutional 
court 
No defined 
time restriction 
Turkey DDA Government Fundamental 
rights, 
individual 
rights and 
duties and the 
political 
rights and 
duties cannot 
be regulated 
by decrees 
having force 
of law 
Assembly 
Constitutional 
Court 
Submission to 
Assembly on 
the day of 
issuance 
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Turkey CDA Government 
under the 
chairmanship of 
the President 
No restriction Assembly 30 days for 
discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources of Table 1: Shugart and Carey (1998) Executive Decree Authority, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press pp 300-320 
 
Explanations: 
CDA: Constitutional Decree Authority 
 
DDA: Delegated Decree Authority 
 
EDA: Emergency Decree Authority 
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Table 2 
 
Regulation areas of the decrees having force of law 
Subject Authorization 
law 
Decrees 
issued 
Decrees 
enacted 
Fiscal and social rights of public 
employees 
1589 
2171 
2999 
3268 
3755 
3911 
3990 
4066 
12 
5 
4 
53 
14 
7 
1 
5 
 
1 
1 
- 
7 
2 
- 
- 
- 
Organization and cadres 1877 
2171 
2680 
3268 
3755 
3911 
3390 
4004 
4109 
1 
1 
108 
64 
23 
29 
5 
6 
1 
- 
- 
37 
13 
4 
2 
- 
- 
- 
Economic and fiscal provisions for 
public administration 
2171 
3987 
15 
5 
5 
- 
Administrative regulations and 
processes 
2977 
3481 
4113 
29 
3 
12 
23 
1 
- 
Money brokers and bankers 2578 13 12 
Profession chambers 2767 18 14 
Money and capital 2810 
3991 
4113 
4 
3 
1 
 
2 
- 
- 
State of emergency 2935 20 3 
Natural gas 3378 3 1 
Source: Kanun Hukmunde Kararnameler Kulliyati vol 1, 2, 3, 4,5 
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Figure 1 
 
The number of decrees issued by governments 
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Figure 2 
 
Decrees according to their authorization laws 
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